Abstract -/- Artiklen gør op med en tolkning af Arendts teori om dømmekraft som bestående af to forskellige teorier; en om dømmekraft som umiddelbar skelneevne, og en dømmekraft som diskursiv fornuft. Denne tvedeling kan genfindes hos flere nulevende filosoffer, som Albrecth Wellmer, Jürgen Habermas, Richard Bernstein, Seyla Benhabib, hvoraf sidstnævnte ydermere associerer dem med de to filosofihistoriske dømmekraftbegreber, nemlig Aristoteles’ phronesisbegreb og Kants begreb om den refleksive dømmekraft. I sin rekonstruktion søger artiklen at komme bag om denne opdeling ved at (...) spore gennemgående træk i Arendts værk, som går på tværs af forholdet mellem handling og tænkning. (shrink)

At forstå med kroppen – Udvalgte dele af Løgstrups kritik af Kant.

In a certain sense, trust really cannot be created at all, because trust lies outside that which we can decide. But trust itself contains some creative element in the sense that trust allows our feeling for the new to gain a place in our experience of the world, including our experience of our own future and the future of others as promising. In that sense, there is an intrinsic element of generation or creation in trust. This circularity between trust and (...) creation points to a virtuous circle of dependency or interdependency between people that communicate. In order to describe this connection between maintaining an open mind towards the new and trust, trust is seen as threefold. It is an attitude of trust in oneself or self-confidence; it is trust in the people one knows and shares experiences with; and it is a more generalized trust understood as an affinity for new things – that is, confidence in meeting whatever the unknown brings on. Looking at both Hannah Arendt's and K.E. Løgstrup’s phenomenological analyses of trust, we see trust as the experience that one is not a sovereign being, but a being that is given over – or as Løgstrup puts it: surrendered - a self-surrender that entails a risk of becoming self-exposure if one’s trust is not accepted. The core of trust is that a person leaves something up to the other, and if that something falls on barren soil, then it withers and dies. But when we are seen and heard, not only as individuals, but as persons with opinions and actions, we achieve visibility, not only to others, we also become visible to ourselves, and experience the world as real in a manner we cannot access by any other means. Løgstrup even speaks of “a trust in life itself, in the ongoing renewal of life” when we are met by others in dialogue. The strength in Løgstrup’s and Arendt’s phenomenological analyses of trust lies in their ability to point out the mutual interdependency between self-surrender and trust, and between appearance and community. Appearance is the ability to be counted on as a person who can stand behind one's actions, and a person who can give promises to others. Community, in this context, both connects and divides us as people with different opinions and perspectives of the same thing. This makes the promise the ultimate deed a person can perform with words, namely, creating relationships with other people in mutuality and respect. One’s ability and, especially, one’s will to be bound to something and to allow oneself to be bound by the promise – these constitute the creativity of trust. Making a promise both creates and confirms the common space within which people count on each other and trust each other. (shrink)